NUCLEAR MADNESS CONTINUES: LET THE GOOD TIMES ROLL

Northrup Grumman's B-21 Raider Stealth Bomber

By Ronald T. Fox

Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin went to the Northrup Grumman plant in California to “unveil” the latest super weapon, guaranteed to deter any aggressor foolish enough to fuck with the US. In what looked like a Hollywood set, with Grumman workers and Austin chanting USA! USA! the Defense Secretary introduced the ultra-secret B-21 Raider stealth bomber. What such grandiose spectacles never do, and I've watched or read about dozens over the last four plus decades, is give specifics about how the new state-of-the-art weapon will make us safer.  This is because they invariably spark enemy countermeasures, making any advantage gained only temporary, if that. Modernized nuclear munitions have never advanced our national security; more correctly, they push us closer to Armageddon.  

Austin introduced the new plane in a nearly 1300-word statement, but only used the word “nuclear” once, par for the course of the defense establishment that does not like to remind the American public about a weapons system geared to mass destruction with the potential to effectively end life on earth. They prefer to refer to nuclear weapons with the code word “deterrence” and emphasize their security-promoting attributes. As Austin put it: the new weapon is designed to deliver conventional bombs as well as adjustable yield nuclear payloads. This, he said, will “fortify America’s ability to deter aggression, today and into the future.” Doesn’t that make you proud to be an American?

Reminds me of the 1950's when I was a young tyke drawn to the Curtis LeMay led Strategic Air Command (SAC) motto, “Peace is our Profession,” which promised “peace” via the threat of total nuclear annihilation of America’s enemies. This "strategy" was known as "Massive Retaliation," which made some sense because at the time the Russians lack a retaliatory capability. What would later become known as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), it implied that America’s leaders and their counterparts in Russia and, later China, seemed to have a collective death wish, a shared willingness to embrace the most violent and catastrophic weapons in the name of peace--an idea appropriately satirized in Stanley Kubrick’s brilliant, Dr. Strangelove. I didn’t pause to think or worry about the implication of “mutual” in the MAD equation. Like most Americans, I put my head in the sand and subscribed to MAD Magazine’s Alfred E. Neuman motto: “What, Me Worry?” This denial would change.

For most of the post-World War II superpower rivalry, Washington and Moscow have raced to achieve unilateral advantage of mind-boggling destructiveness, with atomic bombs thousands of time larger than the bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The original idea was to develop enough nuclear firepower to annihilate each other's major cities. I wasn’t a math wizard, but it seemed to me that this implied an upper ceiling on how many nukes each side would need.  When the total megatons in our nuclear arsenal far exceeded what was necessary to destroy Soviet cities, I began to wonder why we continued to build more and never seemed to have enough.  

Surely, our strategic "thinkers" weren't planning to fight a nuclear war with such weapons of mass destructiveness, but how could you explain the development of missiles carrying multiple warheads with great accuracy, more than was necessary to level a city? The thought that our nuclear deterrent was now vulnerable gave me nightmares.  The nuclear danger now appeared more real.  If the retaliatory ability of the nuclear powers was compromised, wouldn't this increase instability? With this thought in mind, I became obsessed with the imperative of preventing nuclear war.

As the nuclear arms race escalated, the wisdom of deterrence by assured destruction based on overkill began to be similarly questioned by many Americans. This led to the emergence of a robust anti-nuclear movement calling for deep reductions in nuclear weapons and ultimately the establishment of a nuclear-free world. Such thinking didn’t sit well with the advocates of nuclear superiority, especially leading figures in the military-industrial complex who had become addicted to nuclear plenty. Still, the movement gained strength and ultimately helped bring about a series of strategic nuclear arms reduction treaties (START) between the U.S. and Soviet Union. While the agreements did reduce the numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), they did little to curb the numbers of warheads or their ability to destroy hardened enemy targets. In fact, START missile limits provided incentives to improve the capabilities of allowable stockpiles. Innovation would not be curbed.

If the logic of MAD against adversary cities (despite the horrific mutual consequences if deterrence failed) made some sense from the standpoint of deterrence, why didn’t U.S. strategic planners rest when they achieved a capability to destroy all such cities in the Soviet Union? After all, there are a limited number of cities of strategic value to target. Why exceed requisite numbers for assured destruction? The answer is strategists had become uncomfortable with MAD, which was based on a balance of nuclear terror. They wanted nuclear superiority.

To justify more nuclear firepower, we needed to target not just cities, but Soviet nuclear forces and other strategic assets. This led to abandoning MAD as our strategic doctrine and articulating a new strategy called “counterforce.” Under this strategy, cities would be spared. The new doctrine obviated limits; we would have to keep building to be able to counter any new enemy strategic threats, broadly defined. If the Russians built missile defenses or made their deterrent mobile (like going to sea), we would have to develop counter measures.  There would be no logical ceiling to the nuclear arms race.

In addition to the illusive quest for nuclear superiority justifying nuclear plenty, technological hubris itself also helped fuel the nuclear arms race. This is the belief, particularly strong, it seems, in America, that technical innovation can solve all problems. Nuclear scientists and engineers can be seduced by the challenge of what they can accomplish with their minds. I submit that throughout the history of the nuclear age technological innovations preceded doctrinal shifts in strategy, and not vice versa. Once a new technology became feasible, we pursued it; later we manufactured a national security (i.e. deterrence) rationale.

When brilliant minds learned how to put multiple warheads on single missiles, and independently deliver them from land or sea to designated targets with precision accuracy, we went for it. Later we supplied the counterforce rationale. When, more recently, another technological breakthrough allowed us to produce smaller, low yield, smart precision-guided munitions (PGMs), few in the nuclear priesthood paused to ask why such weapons were needed. The thinking, in theory, seemed to be if it advances our capabilities to fight all kinds of wars, including nuclear, from limited to all-out, go for it. How do you fight a limited nuclear war?

If it isn’t exactly clear how greater missile accuracy fits into our strategic planning, one thing is crystal clear to me: such munitions, if deployed, by threatening to degrade, or potentially eliminate, an adversary’s ability to launch a retaliatory strike might encourage that adversary to launch on warning of an attack for fear of losing their retaliatory capability. This not only increases uncertainty, but worse, if a nuclear attack warning was erroneous—a computer glitch, malfunctioning early warning satellite, the work of a hacker, an insane launch commander, or some other breakdown in a command and control system— nuclear war could be unleashed by accident. (The U.S. has twice gone to DEFCON 2 based on erroneous information, fortunately not during a time of high US-Soviet tensions.). Increased nuclear bomb accuracy not only undermines the logic of deterrence, it makes all-out nuclear war more likely. 

The more recent march of nuclear technology toward smaller, smart, precision-guided munitions doesn’t enhance security; it makes crossing the nuclear threshold more likely. Now the nuclear powers have atomic warheads of variable yields that can be delivered from anything from howitzers, canons, and cruise missiles to land-based ICBMs, sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), fighter aircraft, and, of course, stealth bombers, weapons can theoretically be used across continents and in theaters of conflict. The Strangelovian thinkers who have dominated U.S. nuclear war planning tell us that by making nuclear use more thinkable our enemies will be somehow deterred, not just from nuclear attack but even conventional military aggression. Such reasoning is seriously flawed. All such weapons do is accentuate instability, increasing the risk of inadvertent conflict and rapid, uncontrollable conflict escalation.

Throughout the nuclear age, a preoccupation with making nuclear weapons more usable has been a fools' mission. It's been a prescription for an endless arms race, bloated military budgets, and, worse of all, an increased likelihood of nuclear war. When the use of city-busters was unthinkable, the world was far safer than now with the expansive growth of mini-nukes that entice fantasies about limited nuclear use that would somehow not escalate to an all-out nuclear war if the nuclear powers were involved. Once the nuclear threshold is crossed, anything can happen.  Escalation control has been a popular subject among strategic planners for over a half century.  Try as they have, no one has figured out how an enemy would respond once a nuclear weapon has been deployed. 

The growing acceptance and proliferation of compact atomic munitions also raises the possibility some versions of them will fall into the hands of unstable regimes, and, potentially, terrorist groups.  Where there's a will, there's a way.

This brings me back to why I cringed at an unveiling of the latest “state-of-the-art" nuclear weapon, like the Air Force’s B-21 Raider. (It looks much like its predecessor, the B-2 Spirit, with its bat-shaped, flying wing design driven by stealth to avoid radar detection.) The Air Force plans to buy “at least” 100 of these planes at a projected cost of $750 million each. This is pure fantasy. Large DOD weapons projects never end up costing what is originally estimated. (In fact, in proposing a new weapon, the Pentagon often buys-in “cheap” to minimize possible Congressional resistance, knowing full well that there will be inevitable “cost growth.”) With inevitable delays and cost overruns, the flyaway cost will unquestionably exceed well over $1 billion per plane. This means taxpayers would be footing the bill for between $100 and $200 billion, or more, and nearly as much to operate and maintain the bomber over its lifetime. 

Not only are miniature nuclear armaments designed for war fighting illogical for deterrence purposes, and dangerously destabilizing as well, nuclear bombers themselves add little to our ability to deter aggression. The original argument for such bombers is that they can be used to show resolve, but, if necessary, recalled if circumstances change. This is supposed to provide flexibility in a potential ladder of escalation. An adversary would want to avoid escalation to a nuclear level, so a flexible bomber presence would get them to back off—at least in theory.

Such an argument might have made some sense in the 1950's and early 1960's (though Dr. Strangelove might beg to differ), but it makes no sense in an era of land and sea-based guided missiles. If Russia and China, for example, are not deterred by America’s powerful array of invulnerable SLBMs, with multiple warheads, they’re not going to be deterred by a couple hundred B-21 stealth bombers, no matter what the Pentagon, Air Force, hawkish officials, pro-military Congressmen, or bomber manufacturers want you to believe. No amount of Hollywood-inspired propaganda glorifying the B-21 and positing Armageddon scenarios will change the ultimate truth—nuclear bombers in the missile age are a waste of taxpayer dollars.

Simple common sense, however, won’t change the outcome. The B-21 Raider will be produced and ultimately made operational. The Air Force is not going to compromise its perceived role in our nuclear triad of land, sea and air forces. They’re not going to concede any advantage to their main service rival, the Navy, not when new technologies emerge that can improve current bomber capability. After all, the Navy is getting its own new generation of nuclear submarines and missiles. Nor is the Air Force inclined to abandon their time-honored belief in the role of strategic bombers as “winning weapons,” which they’ve celebrated since the dropping of "war winning," atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  (For a critical perspective on the widespread American belief that the atomic bomb was the winning weapon in World War II, see my previous Phronesis posts: Part I on Truman's decision to drop the bombs:  http://phron-e-sis.blogspot.com/2021/08/revisiting-hiroshima-myth.html#more; and, Part II on Japan's decision to surrender:  http://phron-e-sis.blogspot.com/2021/07/part-ii-why-did-japanese-surrender.html 

The Air Force is not alone in wanting the B-21. They enjoy a vast network of allies, including the main contractor Northrop Grumman, hundreds of parts suppliers (there are already some 400 scattered across 40 states), and numerous members of Congress hungry to bring military contracts to their home states. This means tens of thousands of jobs (though more jobs would be created if the same amount of money were invested in a public sector programs), which brings labor and fence-sitting legislators on board. Military spending is rarely partisan issue.

Emboldened conservatives in the new Republican-led Congress are predicted to demand deep spending cuts before they agree to allow raising of the national debt ceiling.  Defense spending, however, will be hands off, meaning that social programs and government regulations will take the big hit.  And so it goes.

Nobody knows how much the B-21 will ultimately cost, or how many we will be able to afford. Given cost overruns our procurement system guarantees, we may end up getting far fewer than the Air Force desires. And, as is also common in large weapons projects, we can expect various performance bugs, especially if developmental and operational testing is not conducted honestly, which is frequently the case. Since project money is disbursed in stages after a previous stage is completed, escalating cost can motivate a weapons maker to manufacture a “successful” test to give the appearance of a successfully completed stage, hence opening the money spigot. This is a common practice that often results in weapons that don’t work like they're supposed to, hence requiring costly fixes. (Fudged testing occurred, for examples, in the B-1 bomber, F-18 Hornet, F-35 Joint Strike and Abrams Tank programs, to name just a few.). Such fix-in necessities are not problematic for our weapons makers as they lead to new contracts, which means more spending, profits, and jobs. They never lead to a cancellation once “sunk costs” have reached a politically irreversible level. Some believe project bugs and premature obsolescence are planned.  And, why not, since Congress is virtually guaranteed to keep the money flowing. 

The bottom line is that the Air Force, and the rest of the military-industrial-complex, is perfectly willing to use your tax dollars for, in this case, a totally unnecessary new stealth bomber. They are also planning to secure full funding for a next generation ICBM to place in the existing admittedly vulnerable, Minuteman ICBM silos in the mid-West. From a national security perspective, this costly procurement also makes no sense since it is redundant to the Navy’s maneuverable and far more survivable SLBM nuclear deterrent. Land-based missiles are sitting ducks for today’s more accurate ballistic missiles, many of which have earth-penetrating -warheads.

The Air Force sees the new ICBM, known as the LGM-35A Sentinel, as a necessary modernization of the land-based leg of our nuclear triad.  They claim it will cost less than extending the life of the current Minuteman fleet.  This claim is dubious, given the predictable cost escalation dynamic mentioned above, as is the strategic need to modernize our anachronistic land-based deterrent.  Neither of these justifications make any sense.  What does, is the Air Force's unwillingness to concede anything to the Navy, who is getting a new fleet of nuclear submarines.

Like for the B-21 unveiling, the Air Force called out its best peace and security-promoting rhetoric to justify the Sentinel.  General Anthony Cotton, commander of the Air Force Global Strike Command, played true to the time-honored marketing ploy: "Sentinel is the next-generation, capable ICBM we need.  Nuclear deterrence is central to our defense posture and more important now than it's ever been. This system will be a highly resilient and capable deterrent that will bring global stability to us and our allies for decades to come."  I'll sure sleep better tonight.

No doubt Congress will fully fund the Air Force shopping list.  It wouldn’t dare say no to a combine as politically powerful as the Air Force-Northrup Grumman consortium and its network of allies. Nor will it say no to other new nuclear weapons being pushed by other military-industry partnerships: General Dynamics, the maker of the Navy’s new ballistic missile submarine; Lockheed Martin, which produces SLBMs; and, firms like Honeywell that overseas key elements in the Department of Energy’s nuclear-warhead complex.  In addition to military-corporate alliances, advocates for nuclear modernization include the Pentagon, hawkish interest groups, impacted unions (like the Machinists Union), and friendly members of Congress. The new weapons community can usually count on a good word from a former high officer who left the service to work for a weapons contractor. The so-called “swinging door” is alive and well.

They can also count on support from most of the American public, especially after people get inundated with threat warnings (usually embellished), doomsday scenarios, and Hollywood-staged images of the cutting edge, new super weapon. Absent in the sales pitch will be any serious exposure to the reality of the pure havoc such weapons and their payloads can cause or serious consideration of the exorbitant cost to taxpayers for weapons that under the logic of deterrence can never actually be used—or, if used, would bring unfathomable destruction to civilian populations, not only of our enemies, but likely to our allies and the good ol’ USA as well.

Imagine the horrific damage a fleet of B-21s and Sentinels could someday inflict on Russia or China, or what their nuclear arsenals could do to us. Or rather, be smart and don’t imagine it at all. Why worry? Instead, like those at Northrup Grumman, Congress and the defense establishment, just let the good times toll.