PART II. WHY DID THE JAPANESE SURRENDER?

By Ronald T. Fox

WHY DID THE JAPANESE SURRENDER?

It is conventional wisdom that the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, along with Truman’s threat to launch a “reign of ruin” on Japan the likes of which the world had never seen, forced the Japanese Supreme Council (consisting of the six top members of the government—The Big Six) to accept the Potsdam Declaration demanding its “unconditional surrender.” Assessing the validity of this claim requires looking at the war situation from Japan’s perspective. Were the atomic bombings, and the threat of more to come, the main reason Japan’s Supreme Council decided to surrender? To answer this question, it is necessary to examine the timing of the surrender decision as well as how the top Japanese political and military leaders saw their strategic options in August of 1945.

Joseph Stalin Japan wanted to bring the war to an end on the best possible terms. To accomplish this, it had two options: one diplomatic and one military. On the diplomatic front, since Japan nominally had a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union, it thought Stalin might be willing to mediate a settlement that would not require unconditional surrender. Not only might Japan be able to keep their emperor, but also avoid war crimes trials and possibly even keep some of the territories it had conquered. Japan figured Moscow might welcome the establishment of terms less favorable to the U.S. The military option was to bolster the capability of Japan’s Imperial Army to inflict heavy casualties on American troops in the event of an invasion. The army entrusted with defending the homeland was still some 800,000 strong. It had not been diminished by the Hiroshima atomic bombing on August 6. Prime Minister Togo and His Cabinet Military leaders believed If the Army could prove formidable, and possibly even win a decisive battle, this might motivate the Americans to negotiate a termination of the war on better terms for Japan—or so it was hoped. Expecting that an invasion would begin in the southern island of Kyushu (correctly as it turned out), the bulk of the Japanese army was shifted to the south. So, on August 8 both of Japan’s strategic options were thus still alive: Stalin might still mediate, and the capacity of the Japanese Army’s to inflict punishment defending the homeland remained viable. Moscow’s declaration of war against Japan on August 8, a week before it had promised to do so at the Yalta Conference, and its prompt invasion of Manchuria and Sakhalin Island, however, changed the picture dramatically. Although the Japanese thought Soviet belligerence likely at some point, the sudden Russian declaration of war and the Red Army’s blitzkrieg-like offensive in Manchuria left them stunned and demoralized. Soviet Invasion of Manchuria Stalin’s belligerency wiped out the diplomatic option. Japan’s shifting of its best troops to the southern part of the home islands, left the north of Japan poorly defended. The Soviet Army sliced quickly through Manchuria and Sakhalin and was preparing to invade the northern Japanese Island of Hokkaido. It appeared the Red Army would soon land on Honshu. Japan was now facing a potential two-front war. While the bombing of Hiroshima had foreclosed neither of Japan’s strategic options, the Soviet invasion has foreclosed both. Japanese intelligence had predicted that the U.S. would not invade for several months, possibly not until late 1945 or early 1946. This provided time for its Army to dig in and prepare for a decisive battle. The Soviet invasion and immediate threat to the home islands, however, turned the Supreme Council’s fear, originally expressed in June 1945, that Soviet entry into the war would “determine the fate of the empire,” into a reality. The prospect of a Communist Japan haunted the regime.  It now became critical to end the war as quickly as possible, and it was deemed far better to deal with the Americans than Stalin and the Red Army. On the morning of August 9, the Supreme Council met for the first time in the war to discuss the unconditional surrender terms set forth in the Potsdam Declaration. Though Japan had explored ways to negotiate and end to the war, which the U.S. knew because we had broken their communication codes, it was adamantly opposed to surrendering unconditionally since this would likely result in an occupation, the loss of authority of the emperor, dramatic changes to the country’s form of government, its beliefs, traditions and ways of life, and, possibly, to war crimes trials, which had been hinted at in the Potsdam Declaration. So, what motivated the Supreme Council to meet on August 9 to discuss the terms of surrender? Contrary to the established winning weapon narrative, it wasn’t the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. First, it is doubtful the bombing of Hiroshima pushed Japan’s political and military leaders to consider unconditional surrender. The fact that the Supreme Council decided to disregard Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori’s recommendation to meet on August 8 after Hiroshima, and didn’t meet until a day later, suggests that, despite having heard about the city's destruction shortly after the bombing, they didn’t consider it important enough to quickly convene.

Perhaps, as some defenders of the traditional narrative contend, the Council did not fully understand the nature and magnitude of the new weapon. This isn’t likely. Japan had its own nuclear research program and were aware of the potential release of vast amounts of energy stored in atomic nuclei. They knew that an American bomb had been built but were unsure if it would be used.  When Japanese radar picked up a single airplane approaching Hiroshima, some of The Big Six suspected it might be carrying an atomic bomb, but no warning was issued to Hiroshima-- until 8:13 a.m.

Accounts of Hiroshima's destruction had been circulating, and several military officers mentioned in their diaries that the city had been destroyed by a nuclear weapon, but Japanese authorities didn't tell people what kind of bomb it was. Military leaders doubted another atomic bomb would be dropped.

A Bombed-out Tokyo There is good reason why the Japanese might not have been shocked by the horrors of the mass destruction of Hiroshima and, later, Nagasaki. The country had endured day and night fire bombings of its cities for weeks, resulting collectively in far more devastation and loss of life. In Tokyo alone, 16 square miles of the city were destroyed, and an estimated 120,000 Japanese died. Japan had become numbed to destruction well before the atomic bombs. Sixty-six of its cities had been destroyed. If they didn’t surrender after all this destruction, why would the leveling of yet two more cities make them change their mind? So, if Hiroshima didn’t push the Supreme Council to meet when it did at 11:00 on August 9, what did? Was it the Nagasaki bombing? Again, timing suggests it wasn’t Nagasaki. When the Supreme Council met on the morning of August 9, Nagasaki had not yet been bombed, and the city had not been issued a warning of a pending attack. The Council would not learn about Nagasaki until a half hour into their meeting, after they had deadlocked on the question of surrendering. The Nagasaki bombing appeared to have little impact on the deliberations of the council. Some on the council were willing to consider surrendering, but only if imperial institutions would remain intact and the emperor would not be harmed. The military chiefs were adamant on disarming their own troops, conducting their own war crimes trials, and limiting any occupation to a few remote points on Japanese territory.

Foreign Minister Togo tried to get the council to reduce the conditions to just one: preserving the imperial household, which could potentially reduce the emperor to a figurehead, but the military members rejected it and the meeting ended in deadlock. Later, a full cabinet meeting also couldn’t reach a consensus on surrender conditions.

The fateful meeting convened at 11:30 p.m. and this time Emperor Hirohito joined the deliberations. Each member was given the text of a proposed statement that accepted the terms delineated in the Potsdam Declaration providing that the “Emperor’s status under national laws would not be compromised. Hard-liners considered this statement insufficiently strong enough to guarantee the Emperor’s prerogatives as a sovereign ruler. After back-and-fourths on proper language, Prime Minister Suzuki declared that they must turn to the emperor for guidance.

Emperor Hirohito

Declaring that the war had turned to Japan’s disfavor and lamenting its continuing bloodshed and cruelty, Hirohito told those assembled that it was time to bear the unbearable. He decreed he wished his government would accept the Potsdam Declaration on the basis proposed by Foreign Minister Togo. He then left the room at 2:30 a.m. on August 10. Togo recommended the conference accept the emperor’s decision, which it did, reluctantly, sometime before 4:00 a.m.

By 7:00 a.m. Japan’s sent out a radio transmission stating that the Japanese government would accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration providing they did not “compromise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler.” The offer was dispatched to the U.S. by way of Sweden and Switzerland.

Japan’s response still fell short of the U.S. unconditional surrender demand. While Stimson and Leahy favored accepting the offer, Byrnes and other strong voices within the administration questioned whether the Japanese reply met the definition of unconditional surrender. They urged fighting on. At that point, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal recommended accepting the offer and declaring that it accomplished what the Potsdam Declaration demanded. J. Roberrt Moskin in his book, Mr. Truman’s War, quotes Forrestal as saying: “Say that the Emperor and the Japanese government will rule subject to the orders of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. This would imply recognition of the Emperor while tending to neutralize American public passions against the Emperor.” Forrestal thought such a statement would be close enough to 'unconditional.”

Some advisers expressed disappointment the reply didn’t demand that Japan implement features of American democracy, such as free speech. Stimson thought this unrealistic, saying that the most important thing was to secure Japan’s surrender before the Russians got too deep into Manchuria and before they could claim a share of control of postwar Japan. Truman’s more conservative advisers were adamant that the US must do what was necessary to end the war as quickly as possible so the country could turn its attention to the looming Soviet threat to our interests in the region, even if this meant letting Japan keep the emperor with at least some authority. They thus supported Byrnes’ August 11 surrender terms.

Truman, however, was uneasy with what he saw as a unilateral revision of the Potsdam Declaration. He worried about the American public’s reaction to what might be considered appeasement, and he didn’t trust the Japanese. The suggestion of special guarantees to Hirohito, whom he considered a war criminal along the lines of Hitler and Mussolini, was deeply distasteful to him. Truman believed Hirohito had abetted Japanese aggression and if left with imperial authority could push for a resurgence of Japanese nationalism in the future. These concerns had previously led to Truman’s rejection of Stimson and Leahy’s advice to accept Tokyo’s original August 10 offer.

Japanese leaders began deliberating on Byrnes’ revised offer on August 12. Military leaders on the Supreme Council had dug in their heals in opposition to the modified unconditional surrender terms. They were prepared to fight to the death to uphold Japan’s honor, even if it meant the destruction of the empire. Only Togo favored acceptance. When Prime Minister Suzuki, fearing a loss of the emperor’s prerogatives and Allied disarming of Japanese troops, sided with the uniformed officers, the full cabinet rejected the American reply. They drafted a paper rejecting the American offer.

Hirohito felt differently. When Togo reported the rejection decision to Hirohito, the emperor was disappointed, telling told him it was his desire to accept the revised Allied offer. Hirohito summoned the cabinet on August 14 and, after listening to arguments against acceptance of the surrender terms, reaffirmed his decision to surrender. The emperor gave his reasons for surrender in a recorded message to his subjects. The war, he said, had developed “not necessarily to Japan’s advantage.” Mentioning the enemy’s use of atomic weapons, which he said threatened all civilization,* His Majesty accepted the Potsdam Declaration. Later (on August 17) he issued a rescript to the military in which he noted that the Soviet entry into the war had so altered the situation as to put the nation’s existence at risk. It was for this reason, he states, he wanted to “make peace” with the Allies.

At 11:00 p.m. on August 14, the foreign ministry telegraphed Switzerland and Sweden to notify the Allies that the Japanese government had agreed to surrender according to terms of the Potsdam Declaration and Allied stipulation concerning the status of the emperor. When the Japanese decision to surrender was communicated to Washington, an elated Truman called a press conference and announced, “I deem this reply full acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration which specifies the unconditional surrender of Japan. In the reply there is no qualification.” The status of the emperor and the Japanese government was to be subject to an American occupation under the stewardship of the Supreme Commander, General Douglas McArthur.

Why did Japan accept the main features of the Potsdam Declaration? Japan’s military situation was untenable. It’s navy and air force had been destroyed. Most of its cities lay in ruin. Japan’s deteriorating economic situation compromised its capacity to sustain a military effort. The atomic bombs had been shocking, but Japanese military leaders weren’t all that worried about a reign of atomic ruin. After all, there were few cities left to bomb. Minister of War and Supreme Council member General Korechika Anami agreed, commenting on August 13 that the atomic bombings were no more menacing than the fire bombings Japan had endured from the sky for months. The Japanese cabinet, and Supreme Council barely mentioned the bomb during their surrender deliberations.

The Red Army posed a larger fear to the future of Japanese civilization. But even with all the military and economic considerations, it is likely Japan would have fought on to defend the mainland, for its honor and also to force weary Allies to grant concessions for peace, had Hirohito not intervened to say enough is enough. It is reasonable to conclude that both the atomic bombs and the Soviet Union’s entry into the war were playing on the emperor’s mind. He was unwilling to endure greater Japanese suffering. Truman’s willingness to tolerate the slight modification of unconditional surrender to allow Japan to keep its emperor no doubt also factored into on Hirohito’s decision, though some historians question whether he understood it would be as a figurehead. In the end, Truman got what he wanted, but so did Hirohito, a continuation of the imperial dynasty.

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*  A number of defenders of the Hiroshima Myth site a statement made by Hirohito shortly after the war that a "new and most cruel bomb" had been a significant consideration in Japan's decision to lay down its arms. These words should be more correctly seen as part of a Hirohito face-saving spin to defect the humiliation of Japan's defeat.  It was designed to enable Tokyo to surrender without conceding defeat on the battlefield, where it counted most in the samurai mind. As such, the advent of atomic bombs provided an excuse to surrender, even though Japanese military leaders initially made little distinction between the use of atomic and incendiary weapons.