Sweden has not been involved in foreign wars since 1814. This long, successful record, maintained without the aid of foreign alliances, was instrumental in developing a tradition of neutrality and a general aloofness from active involvement in international affairs. This tradition of aloofness gradually diminished in the years after World War II as Sweden responded to the centripetal pull of European integration and its political, economic and security foreign orientations became increasingly internationalist in both their nature and purposes. Swedes liked to refer to this policy as "active neutrality." Still, throughout the post-War years Sweden stood steadfast in avoiding military alliances with the aim of remaining neutral in any war.
As the nuclear arms race between the U.S. and Soviet Union escalated throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s, the question arose in Sweden as to whether maintaining a strong conventional defense would still provide a deterrent value. Possessing a robust technological capability, and uranium deposits, the question arose of whether Sweden should develop tactical nuclear weapons. After a lively debate. Sweden decided not to embark on a nuclear weapons program. The main argument for opponents of tactical nuclear weapons was that they would not strengthen Swedish deterrence under the most likely conflict scenarios.
Perhaps equally compelling was the argument that Sweden’s security would be better advanced by international efforts to stem the further acquisition and dissemination of atomic armaments. Sweden dedicated itself to working to relax world tensions and reduce the possibility of thermonuclear war. Working within the U.N. framework, under the Unden Plan in 1961, Sweden helped form a non-nuclear club whose members would refrain from permitting the stockpiling of atomic arms on their territories. Sweden also became a member of the 18-Nation Geneva Conference on Disarmament and was active in pushing for a ban on nuclear testing.
After 1959, continued skepticism about the strategic value of nuclear weapons and encouraged by the diplomatic possibilities open to a neutral, non-nuclear power, reinforced the Swedish decision to refrain from any nuclear options. The conventional armed and active neutrality formula had become deeply entrenched in Swedish culture and domestic politics. Political parties on the left and right differed on how closely they wanted to forge relations with the European continent, but on the policy of neutrality as a security framework there was broad consensus. Many observers believed it conformed well with the humanistic and moralistic values held by many Swedes.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, and growing European economic and political integration, changed the calculus for Sweden’s commitment to maintain a strong conventional military and retain a middle position between East and West. In response, the country significantly reduced military spending and began to move (along with Finland) closer institutionally to the West. Eventually it ended its reluctance to compromising its sovereignty in an alliance and applied for membership in the European Union in 1992 and NATO’s Partnership for Peace program in 1994. Membership in NATO, requiring acceptance of NATO’s Article 5, which committed members to collective defense, while seriously considered by more conservative Swedish political parties, was unacceptable to the dominant Social Democrat Party. So, Sweden remained formally militarily non-aligned, though it did forge closer ties with NATO.
In the late 1950’s, Sweden reasoned that the real danger to Sweden’s security was not the threat of an isolated attack on the homeland, but involvement in a general European war in which atomic weapons might be used. Fear of just such an event occurring was raised when Russia invaded Ukraine and President Putin began talking loosely about using nuclear weapons. If the war escalated beyond Ukraine, and tactical nuclear weapons were employed in the European theater, even with the reduced yield weapons in modern nuclear arsenals, Swedes could suffer the adverse effects of detonations even if not attacked directly. The brutality of the Russian invasion intensified Swedish fears, sparking serious discussions about possibly joining NATO. Before the Russian troops entered Ukraine on February 24, only 27% of Swedes favored joining NATO. Shortly afterward, support abruptly jumped to 52%. It has edged up since.
The altered security landscape eroded long-standing Social Democrat Party opposition to NATO membership, though as late as March 8 Social Democrat Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson was still ruling out NATO membership. By mid-April the brutal nature of the Russian aggression, along with mounting civilian casualties shown nightly on Swedish TV, Andersson’s position evolved. Commenting that “given the situation, we have to really think what is best for Sweden and our peace in this new situation.”
| Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson Rethinks Neutrality |
Andersson and the ruling Social Democrat, center-left coalition decided on May 16 to formally end over 200 years of military nonalignment and apply for membership in NATO. Only the small Left and Green parties represented in the Swedish parliament objected to seeking NATO membership. Most Swedes supported membership, though many were uncomfortable with the quickness of the decision process, particularly in light of the country’s long-standing commitment to military non-alignment. It appears Sweden’s atypical rush on such a huge issue was prompted by how quickly neighboring Finland, Sweden’s closest defense cooperation partner, took the historic step to seek membership. Stockholm rushed through its national debate in order to align itself with Finland’s calendar. The new security calculus notwithstanding, without Finland, it’s unlikely Sweden would have made the momentous move to join NATO, at least when it did.
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| Prime Minister Andersson and Finland's Prime Minister Sanna Marin Jointly Applied For NATO Membership, Ending Nordic Neutrality |
The decision to seek membership in NATO is, indeed, a big thing. I wouldn’t have dreamed of it a half century ago when I wrote my Ph.D dissertation on Neutrality and Internationalism: Swedish Foreign Policy 1945-1965, and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which seemed to signal that war on the European continent was the remotest of possibilities. The central thesis in my dissertation was that while domestic forces in Sweden rallied around the idea of non-alignment, and helped sustain its persistence, the actual conduct of the country’s foreign policy was shaped essentially by factors arising from the international environment of power politics. The Russian invasion, in Sweden’s mind, significantly altered the strategic calculus.
While I can understand Sweden’s decision, especially since Prime Minister Andersson made it clear that Sweden would refuse nuclear weapons or permanent NATO bases on its soil (similar to Norway and Denmark), what surprised me is how Swedish leaders downplayed how membership would impact the country’s global diplomatic role, specifically, its capacity, however modest, to press for nuclear disarmament, arms control, building bridges to Russia and China, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Since the early 1960's, this perceived role was at least as important as security considerations in justifying neutrality and nonalignment. Pessimism about peace-promoting possibilities for small nations in today’s deeply divided world likely played into Sweden's re-thinking.
Sweden and Finland’s accession into NATO, while providing the benefit of Article 5 security assurances, comes with unprecedented obligations to conform the nation’s defense to NATO priorities. Both countries will be expected to spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense, an amount Sweden is already close to reaching after boosting defense spending in response to the Ukraine war. Military experts say both countries would also be expected to contribute to any maritime choke holds to be put in place in the Baltic Sea in the event in a wider war with Russia, raising the prospect of direct engagement with allied Russian forces.
Approval of Sweden’s application for membership was not a slam dunk as it required unanimity among all 30 members of the alliance. From the outset, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan voiced objections to both Sweden and Finland for what he said were their lax approaches toward groups Ankara deems national security risks, including the Kurdish Workers Party, or PKK, and its Syrian extension. Turkey demanded that Sweden and Finland strengthen anti-terrorism laws, cut ties to Kurdish militias fighting the Islamic State in Syria, extradite wanted individuals he claimed were living in their countries, and lift arms restrictions they imposed after Turkey’s 2019 military incursion into northeast Syria.
| The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) |
Sympathetic to Kurdish refugees and inclined to regard the PKK and other Kurdish groups seeking autonomy from Ankara as nationalist rather than terrorist organizations, Prime Minister Andersson said her government would not bow to Turkish demands. This bold assertion didn’t square with the reality of her center-left coalitions government’s tenuous hold on power.
Far-right opposition groups that have been challenging Andersson’s government for its response to rising crime and recently almost won a no-confidence vote on the coalition’s justice minister, which would have led to Andersson’s resignation. A political crisis was averted when an independent lawmaker of Iranian-Kurdish origin, Amineh Kakabaveh, abstained from the vote. The lawmaker’s decision to abstain came after the government said it would continue supporting Kurdish militants fighting the Islamic state in Syria. Acknowledging that Sweden is in a “very sensitive position—together with Finland,” Andersson called the no-confidence effort “utterly irresponsible.” Still, the Social Democrat Party worried that the disgruntled opposition could try to piggyback on the Kurdish question to try to defeat the center-left government in the upcoming September general election. This concern had to be on Sweden’s mind when it began negotiating over Turkey’s demands. At least it seemed to have reduced Sweden’s leverage.
| Amineh Kakabeveh |
Weeks of back channel diplomacy and hours of talks culminated on the eve of the NATO summit in Madrid with an agreement between Sweden, Finland and Turkey whereby Erdogan withdrew his opposition. Sweden and Finland appeared to give in to Erdogan’s priorities by agreeing to unambiguously condemn all organizations perpetrating attacks against Turkey, including organizations Turkey considers “terrorist,” not impose embargo restrictions on defense items, and address Turkey’s pending deportation or extradition requests of terror suspects, including some journalists, "expeditiously and thoroughly.” Sweden and Finland also pledged to investigate and interdict any financial and other activities of the PKK and other terrorist organizations.
Turkey hailed the June 28 agreement as a triumph, saying that the Nordic nations had agreed to crack down on groups Ankara considers threats to its national security, including the PKK and its Syrian extension: We “got what it wanted” including “full cooperation … in the fight against” the rebel groups.
What does this bode for Swedish domestic politics? Will the Parliament member, Kakabaveh, whose support the government depends on for its majority, defect leading to the coalition’s fall before the September election? Worried that Sweden isn’t revealing what promises it has given to Erdogan, she’s demanding details on exactly what was agreed. Will a backlash from Sweden’s apparent compliance with Turkey’s demands lead to a September election loss for the Social Democrats? Whatever will happen, it’s safe to say that Finland will sail much more smoothly through the domestic political sea than Sweden.
In the time it takes for the 30 allied NATO parliaments to ratify the decision made by the alliance leaders, a process that could take up to a year, much could happen in Sweden, though I doubt it will be significant enough to scuttle Swedish membership in NATO. Popular support for membership is strong and may have been given an additional boost by the growing level of brutality in the Russian campaign in the Donbass region, a constant graphic reminder of the horrors of this bloody war.
It appears Swedish and NATO leaders were confident Sweden’ application for admission would prove successful. While negotiations with Turkey were underway, NATO already began to schedule a whole host of joint exercises involving Sweden and Finland. U.S. warships have already steamed into the Baltic Sea, Air Force bombers are flying over Scandinavian skies, and army forces will soon begin training together. The U.S. amphibious assault ship Kearsarge has arrived in Stockholm harbor in preparation for military exercises.
Conclusion
Sweden has a long tradition of belief in what Marquis Childs in a 1936 book called “The Middle Way.” In the 1930’s, the country subscribed to a middle path between the American and Russian political extremes. This entailed bridging the gap between the “concentration of power in the hands of the few in the U.S. and the autocratic, state-run system in Russia. This “middle way” disposition translated into a hybrid economic system between capitalism and socialism, a state-managed economic approach that drew many admirers in the West. Middle thinking facilitated finding compromise solutions to domestic policy disputes.
It also laid the foundation for Sweden’s decision to remain neutral in World War II (though its neutrality tilted in response to the fortunes of war), and subsequently adopt nonalignment in its security policy, which it believed enhanced its prospects for remaining neutral in any future wars. In its foreign policies, the middle way opened opportunities to play important roles in international peace and arms control treaty negotiations and for mediation and conciliation in global disputes. Sweden charted a middle position in East-West divide during the Cold War, although its allegiance tilted heavily toward the West. When newly independent countries in the Southern Hemisphere launched a non-aligned movement in 1961, Sweden, always sympathetic to underdogs, became their leading advocate in the North. The country drew praise from developing countries for not tying its foreign assistance to purchases from the donor country as was the custom among developed states.
The rigidity of Sweden’s middle way eroded as the country was drawn West by the strong pull of European economic and political integration. Stockholm also increased military cooperation with an expanding NATO. Yet, it remained committed to avoiding formal military alliances until Russian troops moved into Ukraine and Finland decided to seek membership in NATO. With growing Russian aggressiveness and threats posed by China’s “strategic challenges,” and with a younger generation not strongly attached to the non-alignment tradition, the time was ripe for abandoning its centuries old avoidance of military alliances.
Still, it’s important to stress the significance of the Swedish decision. Membership for Sweden obligates the country to comply with Article 5, the collective security clause of the NATO charter, which could find Sweden drawn into a war involving superpowers, a prospect that would have the steadfast architects of Swedish neutrality turning in their graves. Great Swedish diplomats like Count Bernadotte, Raul Wallenberg, Dag Hammarskjold, Alva Myrdal, Hans Blix, Gunnar Jarring and Olof Palme, who considered non-alignment essential for a meaningful global peace-promoting role for Sweden, would be devastated, likely even under current international circumstances. The younger Swedish generation, with faint memories of the past, and, like their contemporaries, less confident in the possibilities for diplomacy, probably see the abandonment of non-alignment as no big deal.
Good article Ron!
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