The U.S.-Russian diplomatic initiative to induce Bashar al Assad to abandon chemical weapons and join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which voided Washington’s threat to use military force, inspired me to reflect on the legacy of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Does the U.S. opting for diplomacy rather than force in Syria mean that Washington learned valuable lessons from its policy debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan? Could it be that the Syrian crisis represents a turning point in the U.S. proclivity to project global power through the use of military force? Unfortunately there is no reason to believe, Syria notwithstanding, that our recent experiences in the Middle East will produce any significant moderation in American militarism. As the Vietnam War failed to produce any lasting dovish tendencies in U.S. security policy, so won’t the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
There are, to be sure, a number of positives to draw from the apparently successful diplomatic effort in Syria. We worked closely with the Russians and through the U.N, rather than in our usual unilateral way, President Obama went to Congress for the authority to order military strikes, rather than acting imperially, as all recent Presidents have done, and the American public sent a clear message that it was in no mood for yet another military adventure in the Middle East. A deeper reflection, however, leads me to believe these positive developments will be fleeting. There is little evidence to conclude that President Obama and the national security elite have lost any appetite for using force first, rather than as a last resort, as the operational code in our approach to peace and security. Expect Washington continue to pursue global dominance in the name of peace, framed in the lofty ideals of promoting democracy, civil society, economic development, and rebuilding failed states.